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We construct a stylised intertemporal macroeconomic model to illustrate how the combination of
decentralised trading and microeconomic uncertainty can generate coordination problems and
indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium. With a competitive labour market and a
ﬁxed labour supply,the range of equilibria depends mainly on the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks and may thus remain fairly narrow . The situation is diﬀerent when there is imperfect
competition on the labour market. The existence of real rigidities is apt to considerably increase
the size of the interval of indeterminacy, for a given variance of the shocks.
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continuum of equilibria
JEL classiﬁcation: E10, E241 Introduction
Business cycle analysts often associate the success or failure of an economic recovery to in-
vestors and/or consumers expectations and degree of conﬁdence. Subjective conﬁdence eﬀects
can hardly be discussed in standard Walrasian setups wherein the knowledge of the economy’s
“fundamentals” typically suﬃces to determine a unique equilibrium trajectory. It is well-known
that there is room for “animal spirits” to aﬀect the macroeconomic outcome only if there are
market imperfections. This paper focuses on a market imperfection arising from the combina-
tion of decentralised trading and microeconomic uncertainty in an intertemporal setup. This
combination creates information problems between agents and can make the macroeconomic
equilibrium depend on agents’ expectations.
In an intertemporal perspective, decentralised trading implies that agents have to make decisions
that will commit them on a market (at least temporarily) while they are still uncertain about
their future trading opportunities. The simplest example is the choice of a productive capacity
under uncertainty about future purchase orders. In a Walrasian setup, such an uncertainty
may in the end have little macroeconomic implications, because (it is assumed that) there is
ex post full information about each other’s trading opportunities. The market works as if
there were a centralised market clearing device, which implies that all agents can realise all (ex
post) proﬁtable transactions. If however agents do not enjoy such an amount of information,
the microeconomic uncertainty may create an information problem between buyers and sellers.
A ﬁrm may end up ex post with an excess productive capacity if it receives fewer purchase
orders than expected, or face a capacity shortage in the opposite case. The possibility of such
outcomes aﬀects the ﬁrm’s investment decision and makes the optimal capital stock depend
on expectations about forthcoming orders. In such a non-Walrasian setup, expectations about
future trading opportunities may aﬀect the actual level of transactions, and make low activity
levels result from low investments following from (self-fulﬁlling) pessimistic expectations.
Our objective is to formalise these intuitions in a model that departs as little as possible from a
standard Walrasian intertemporal macroeconomic model. To introduce the type of information
problem we have in mind, we distinguish ﬁnal and intermediate goods producers. Intermediate
goods producers are all ex ante identical; they use labour and capital to produce an homoge-neous good that is the sole input of ﬁnal goods producers. Both types of ﬁrms operate under
perfect competition. We consider the case where uncertainty arises from the existence of purely
idiosyncratic technological shocks in intermediate ﬁrms. These idiosyncratic shocks imply het-
erogeneous employment and production decisions at the competitive prices and wages. In a
Walrasian world, ﬁnal ﬁrms always buy a quantity of intermediate goods such that every inter-
mediate ﬁrm is always able to sell its optimal production level. This can occur in a decentralised
economy if ﬁnal ﬁrms receive all the relevant information about every intermediate ﬁrm’s situ-
ation and can send purchase orders accordingly. In this case, the microeconomic heterogeneity
may have little or no macroeconomic implication. We want to depart slightly from this sce-
nario by analysing the case where ﬁnal ﬁrms send purchase orders to intermediate ﬁrms without
knowing every intermediate ﬁrm’s optimal production level. The price of the homogeneous in-
termediate good fails to convey to buyers the relevant information about every intermediate
ﬁrm’s situation. An intermediate ﬁrm enjoying a good productivity shock may then receive
too few purchase orders, and vice-versa. The possibility of such outcomes makes the intermedi-
ate ﬁrms investment choice depend on expected forthcoming purchase orders. It is shown that
these expectation eﬀects induce indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium, even with full
employment of a ﬁxed labour supply. This indeterminacy is intrinsically linked to the informa-
tion problem between buyers and sellers induced by the microeconomic uncertainty. Without
idiosyncratic shocks, there is a unique equilibrium, which replicates the Walrasian outcome.
Our paper is related to an already vast literature aiming to understand under what circum-
stances multiple equilibria can occur in a decentralised economy. Those models have in common
the existence of a coordination failure due to some type of “externality” (physical or pecuniary1).
But they diﬀer by the nature of the externality (technological interactions, demand externali-
ties, trading externalities) that is at the root of the coordination problem and generates multiple
equilibria. Hart (1982), Heller (1986), Kiyotaki (1988), Roberts (1987, 1989) and others rely on
multisectoral models with imperfect competition and “aggregate demand externalities” (in the
terminology of Blanchard-Kiyotaki (1987)). Diamond (1982) stresses the eﬀects of decentralised
trading in an economy where the Walrasian auctioneer is replaced by a stochastic matching pro-
cess. Bryant (1983) emphasises imperfect information in a stylised model with complementary
1For a discussion of these concepts, see Silvestre (1995).
2intermediate goods and decentralised decision-making.
Our contribution shares many of the intuitions common to the above-mentioned papers. Our
model is diﬀerent though in that it does not rely on imperfect competition nor on any physical
externality or technological complementarity. The model economy only departs from a Walrasian
one in the working of a competitive market (the intermediate goods one). This departure
would be inconsequential in a world with perfect information. Indeterminacy occurs because
the microeconomic uncertainty implies imperfect information between buyers and sellers. There
is then a continuum of equilibria that can be indexed by demand expectations. This means that
once a relatively pessimistic atmosphere has established itself, a unilateral change in expectations
is never proﬁtable. It is only a coordinated change in expectations that can give intermediate
ﬁrms an incentive to invest more.
We also stress the possible interactions between the mechanism inducing indeterminacy and
the presence of real rigidities on the labour market. With a competitive labour market and
a ﬁxed labour supply, we show that the range of equilibria depends mainly on the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks. It may thus remain fairly narrow if the variance of these shocks
is itself small. The situation becomes totally diﬀerent when there is imperfect competition
on the labour market. Because then both the employment rate and the capital stock change
with demand expectations, the existence of real rigidities is apt to considerably increase the
size of the interval of indeterminacy, for a given variance of the shocks. This result is in line
with Dr` eze (1997, 1999), who emphasises the possibility that, if some relative prices (like the
real wage) are downwardly rigid, underutilisation of resources (at prices compatible with full-
employment) may persist once established, reﬂecting pure coordination failure rather than price
distortions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the description of behaviours
and equilibrium conditions in the Walrasian setup used as a benchmark case in the subsequent
sections. This framework is adapted in section 3 to the case of a non-Walrasian intermediate
goods market. Section 4 introduces imperfect competition on the labour market and assumes
that wages are set by a monopoly union. The main conclusions are summarised in section 5.
32 The Walrasian Economy
We ﬁrst describe the Walrasian economy that will serve as a benchmark case for the rest of the
paper. We consider an economy with two types of ﬁrms, ﬁnal goods producers and intermediate
goods producers. Intermediate good producers face a standard neoclassical technological con-
straint with two inputs (labour and capital), non-increasing returns to scale and idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. All intermediate goods are perfect substitutes in the production of a ﬁnal
good. The latter uses no other input. We limit ourselves to the case where the idiosyncratic
uncertainty generates no macroeconomic uncertainty, which requires that all ﬁrms be ex ante
identical. We thus assume perfect foresight of all macro variables.
2.1 Behaviours
Intermediate Goods Producers
We assume a continuum of ex ante identical competitive ﬁrms, uniformly distributed over the
unit interval. In each ﬁrm, total factor productivity is random. With kt units of capital and `t
units of labour, a ﬁrm produces a quantity of output qt given by:
qt = µt f(kt;`t); (1)
where µt is a stochastic productivity shock, which is ﬁrm speciﬁc and observed at the beginning
of period t. f is concave and strictly increasing (fk;f` > 0, fkk;f`` < 0 and fk` > 0); it
exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. To further simplify the presentation, we assume that




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
µ¡ with probability ¼ satisfying 0 < ¼ < 1;
µ+ with probability 1 ¡ ¼;
(2)
and µ+ > µ¡ > 0. Given our assumptions on the distribution of µt, ¼ represents in every period
both the probability that a given ﬁrm experiences a low productivity level µ¡ and the proportion
of ﬁrms experiencing such a low productivity level.
4Every ﬁrm behaves competitively on all markets and thus takes the intermediate goods price pt,
the wage rate wt and the interest rate rt as given (the ﬁnal good serves as num´ eraire).
We assume the following sequence of events and decisions. An investment made in t¡1 becomes
productive in t. In period t ¡ 1, each intermediate goods producer decides on the productive
capital stock of the next period (kt) without knowing the time t value of total factor productivity
µt. The period t employment and production decisions are only taken after the realised value of µt
has been observed. We analyse this sequence of decisions backwards, starting with employment
at given capital stock.
Optimal labour demand
Given a predetermined capital stock kt and a realised value of the shock, µt 2 fµ¡;µ+g, the
employment decision in period t is the solution of the following programme:
max
`t
pt µt f(kt;`t) ¡ wt `t:




t ) the optimal employment and output levels in a
ﬁrm where productivity is low (resp. high) in period t. The optimal employment level `§
t must
be such that µ§ f`(kt;`§
t ) = wt=pt. This implies:
`§
t = `(kt; !t;µ§) and q§
t = q(kt; !t;µ§) (3)
where !t is the intermediate ﬁrm’s real labour cost in period t, i.e., !t = wt=pt. Functions `
and q are increasing in both kt and µt and decreasing in !t. Appendix 1 derives these functions
in the case of a Cobb Douglas technology.
Investment decision




t ) denote the gross operating proﬁts of a ﬁrm experiencing a low (resp. high)
productivity shock in t. One has
Π§
t = pt Π(kt;!t;µ§) where Π(kt;!t;µ§) = q§
t ¡ !t `§
t : (4)
5Function Π is concave in kt and decreasing in !t.








t + (1 ¡ ¼)Π+
t ¡ [kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt]
o
: (5)
k1 is given, ± is the depreciation rate (with 0 < ± < 1) and R1;t is the discount factor associated
to period t: if rs is the real interest rate in period s, R1;t = Πt
s=2 (1 + rs)¡1 for t > 1 and
R1;1 = 1. The ﬁrst-order optimality condition of the maximisation of (5) with respect to kt+1
is:
ºt+1 = ¼ Πk(kt+1;!t+1;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)Πk(kt+1;!t+1;µ+) 8 t; (6)
where ºt+1 denotes the real capital usage cost (ºt+1 = (rt+1 +±)=pt+1) and Πk denotes the ﬁrst
partial derivative of function Π with respect to its ﬁrst argument2.
In the case of decreasing returns-to-scale, the ﬁrst-order optimality condition (6) can be solved
for capital:
kt+1 = K(ºt+1; !t+1 ;Θ); (7)
where Θ summarises the parameters characterising the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
(Θ = (¼;µ¡;µ+)). Function K is decreasing in both º and !. In the case of constant returns
to scale, Πk does not depend on the level of the capital stock and the optimality condition (6)
implies a tight and inverse relationship between capital and labour costs; the optimal size of the
individual ﬁrm then remains undetermined (see appendix 1 for the Cobb Douglas case).
Final Goods Producers
To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the ﬁnal good production process
uses only intermediate goods. We furthermore assume constant returns to scale3 and perfect





2One checks easily that Πk(k;!;µ
§) is equal to the marginal productivity of capital µ
§ fk(k;`
§).
3Assuming decreasing returns breaks the equality between intermediate and ﬁnal good prices but does not
change our results qualitatively.
6where yt is the ﬁnal output level and qjt is the quantity of input j used in production.
Perfect competition between intermediate good producers implies a unique price pjt = pt; 8 j.
With the production technology (8), the intermediate goods market clearing condition will
further imply that pt be equal to the price of the ﬁnal good, i.e., pt = 1.
Whatever its output level, a ﬁnal ﬁrm will make zero proﬁts and will accept to serve any ﬁnal
demand level. Its total demand for intermediate goods is equal to its output level yt. In a
Walrasian market, the allocation of this total demand across intermediate ﬁrms coincides with
the Walrasian output levels of those ﬁrms.
Consumers
A representative inﬁnitely-lived consumer supplies inelastically one unit of labour in every period
and lends her ﬁnancial wealth to input ﬁrms. Her total revenue coincides with the total gross
domestic income: wage and interest rate income, plus the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Let at+1 be the real
ﬁnancial wealth of the consumer4 at the end of period t. Her optimisation programme can then










subject to: at+1 + ct = (1 + rt)at + Πt + wt; 8 t;
and: lim
t!1
R1;t+1 at+1 ¸ 0;
where Πt stands for the total amount of proﬁts distributed by intermediate ﬁrms.




u0(ct+1); 8 t ¸ 1: (9)
Alternatively, let ¸t+1 represent the marginal utility of consumption in t + 1. The optimal
consumption behaviour in t is given by
ct = C ((1 + rt+1)¸t+1); (10)
4Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, distinguishing shares and loans would add nothing: the equilibrium
price of shares will always be such that both types of assets yield the same sure return. With perfect capital
markets, adding (lump-sum) taxes and a government sector would introduce no interesting changes. With a ﬁxed
amount of government expenditures, it would solely aﬀect the consumption level.
7where function C (´ u0¡1) is decreasing in its argument.
2.2 General Equilibrium
With ex ante identical ﬁrms, the equilibrium conditions can be summarised as follows.
On the intermediate goods markets, equilibrium implies that pt = 1. At given kt, all input
producers have identical low- or high employment and output levels. I.e., the production level
of any intermediate ﬁrm is determined by:
qt =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
q(kt ;!t ;µ¡) if µt = µ¡ ;
q(kt ;!t ;µ+) if µt = µ+:
(11)
The equilibrium condition between the total input demand (yt) and supply can be written as:
yt = ¼ q(kt; !t;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)q(kt; !t;µ+): (12)
On the ﬁnal goods market, the equilibrium condition imposes that:
yt = ct + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt ; (13)
where ct is given by (10) and kt+1 is such that (6) is satisﬁed.
On the labour market, there is full employment of the labour force (normalised to 1). The
equilibrium condition is:
1 = ¼ `(kt; !t;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼) `(kt; !t;µ+); (14)
which, at given initial capital stock kt, determines the equilibrium real wage !t.
Obviously, at given ¸t+1 and !t+1, the period t equilibrium is uniquely determined 5. There is
also a unique stationary equilibrium, with real interest rate equal to the subjective time discount
rate (r = ½, see 9) and thus º = ½ + ±.
5At given capital stock, (14) determines the equilibrium real wage !t and therefore the equilibrium output
level, yt, and the interest rate rt+1 (by using (12) and (13) successively).
83 The non-Walrasian Economy
With decentralised trading, the Walrasian equilibrium allocation can be reached if and only
if every ﬁnal ﬁrm is perfectly and costlessly informed about the optimal production level of
every intermediate good supplier. In such a scenario, the fact that there is a microeconomic
uncertainty has no deep macroeconomic implication; in particular it does not prevent ex post a
perfect match between demands and supplies.
We now turn to the consequences of not assuming perfect information. More speciﬁcally, we
consider an economy with decentralised trading where ﬁnal ﬁrms have to send purchase orders
without full information about the shocks that hit the diﬀerent input suppliers. An intermediate
ﬁrm may then face a sales constraint since the orders it receives may fall short of its Walrasian
output level. This possibility aﬀects its investment decision and makes the optimal capital stock
depend on expectations about forthcoming orders.
We limit ourselves to the case where the ﬁnal good ﬁrm sends the same purchase order qd
t to all
input ﬁrms. This assumption of identical purchase orders is only made for convenience. But it
also seems to be a sensible simpliﬁcation in a setup where the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm cannot distinguish
among intermediate goods producers. We further assume that all input ﬁrms expect the same
purchase orders. This simpliﬁcation makes all input ﬁrms ex ante identical and implies that
there will be no macroeconomic uncertainty.
3.1 Behaviours
Intermediate Goods Producers
We analyse backwards a sequence of events and decisions that is, mutatis mutandis, comparable
to the one of section 2. At time t¡1, each ﬁrm decides on its capital stock kt without knowing
the productivity shock of period t, and given its expectations about the future demand for its
output qd
t , the intermediate goods price pt and the wage rate wt. The period t employment and
production levels are decided later, after the realised value of the productivity shock has been
observed.
9Optimal labour demand
If a ﬁrm receives a suﬃcient quantity of orders, the optimal output and labour demand levels
remain determined by (3). If the quantity of orders is smaller than the proﬁtable capacity of
the ﬁrm, labour demand corresponds to the employment level necessary to produce qd
t . This
employment level `d





t ;µ); µ 2 fµ¡;µ+g (15)
where function `d is increasing in qd
t and decreasing in the other arguments.
Let Πd











t ; !t; µ
´
: (16)
Function Πd is easily shown to be increasing in qd and decreasing in both k and !.
Optimal capital stock
We focus on situations where all input ﬁrms expect demand to lie in between the low and the
high optimal unconstrained output levels. More formally:
q(kt+1; !t+1; µ¡) · qd
t+1 · q(kt+1; !t+1; µ+); 8 t: (17)
The optimal capital stock value must obviously satisfy the ﬁrst inequality, as otherwise ﬁrms
would be, with probability one, below their Walrasian level of output even in the low pro-
ductivity state of nature. The second inequality will also be satisﬁed in our stylised economy
because the ﬁnal ﬁrm knows the intermediate goods ﬁrm’s maximum proﬁtable capacity and
has consequently no incentive to send orders larger than this quantity.
Therefore, an intermediate goods ﬁrm expects to be sales constrained only in the case where it
experiences high productivity level µ+, which occurs with probability 1 ¡ ¼. The capital stock








t + (1 ¡ ¼)Πd
t ¡ [kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt]
o
: (18)
The capital stock kt+1 installed at time t is determined by the following ﬁrst-order optimality
condition:








k is the ﬁrst partial derivative of function Πd with respect to k. The ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side represents the marginal revenue of capital when productivity is low, the
second term the marginal revenue of capital when productivity is high. It is through this last
term that demand expectations aﬀect the optimal capital stock6. More concisely, the above
optimality condition determines the optimal capital stock as a function of factor costs and sales
expectations:
kt+1 = ˜ K(ºt+1;!t+1;qd
t+1; Θ): (20)
Final Goods Producers
The objective and the technological constraint of the representative ﬁnal goods producer remain
the same as in section 2. We now assume though that the ﬁnal goods ﬁrm sends the same
purchase order qd
t to every intermediate goods producer, without knowing which producer has
been hit by a low or a high productivity shock. For every intermediate good, there is now a
positive probability ¼ that the supply will fall short of the ordered quantity and that the ﬁrm
will only receive q¡
t < qd
t . The cost minimisation programme associated to the production of an







t + (1 ¡ ¼)qd
t
i
subject to: ¼ q¡
t + (1 ¡ ¼)qd
t = yt ;
the solution of which is simply qd
t = (yt ¡ ¼q¡
t )=(1 ¡ ¼). With constant returns-to-scale, ﬁnal
ﬁrms make zero proﬁts and their optimal size is not determined (as in the Walrasian economy).
Consumers
The description of consumers’ behaviour remains unchanged.
6Note that, at given demand expectations, the capital stock remains determinate even in the case with constant
returns to scale: in that case, the optimality condition (19) no longer imposes a ﬁxed and tight link between factor
costs as in the Walrasian economy. The link between the wage rate and the interest rate now depends on demand
expectations. This appears clearly in the Cobb Douglas case proposes in appendix 1.
7Under the assumption of perfect substitutability, rationing is inconsequential for a ﬁnal ﬁrm which has cor-
rectly anticipated its possibility and suitably modiﬁed all input demands.
113.2 General Equilibrium
Deﬁnition
In the economy described so far, a full-employment equilibrium in period t is a vector of prices





such that, at given capital stock kt and
given levels of marginal utility of consumption ¸t+1, future demand (qd
t+1) and wage (wt+1), the
following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. ﬁnal and intermediate goods producers maximise their expected proﬁts; consumers max-
imise their utility;
2. on the intermediate goods markets, a proportion ¼ of ﬁrms experiences a low productivity
shock and produces q¡
t , a proportion 1 ¡ ¼ experiences a high productivity shock and
produces qd
t ;
3. there is competitive equilibrium on all the other markets (labour, capital, ﬁnal goods).
The set of equilibrium conditions can be written as follows. On the intermediate goods markets,
pt is equal to 1 and the equilibrium condition is given by:
yt = ¼ q(kt;!t;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼) qd
t : (21)
Given the demand for private consumption (see (10)) and the aggregate demand for capital (see
(20)), the equilibrium condition on the ﬁnal good market becomes:
yt = C ((1 + rt+1)¸t+1 ) + ˜ K(ºt+1;!t+1;qd
t+1; Θ) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt : (22)
Finally, the labour market equilibrium condition implies that labour demand L(kt;!t;qd
t ;Θ) be
equal to the total workforce (normalised to 1):
1 = L(kt;!t;qd
t ;Θ) = ¼ `(kt; !t;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)`d(kt; qd
t ;µ+): (23)
Obviously, the equilibrium so deﬁned is not uniquely determined, as the equilibrium conditions
(21)-(22)-(23) form a system of three equations in four unknowns. At given initial capital stock
12kt and at given values ¸t+1; !t+1 and qd
t+1, there is a continuum of equilibrium factor prices
(wt;rt+1), activity and demand levels (yt;qd
t ): This indeterminacy follows from the assumption
that ﬁnal goods ﬁrms send purchase orders without full information about every intermediate
goods producer’s productivity. This gives a role to demand expectations in the investment
decision of those ﬁrms.
Interval of indeterminacy at a stationary state
Let us denote by z¤ (resp. ¯ z) the stationary state value of a variable z in the Walrasian economy
(resp. in the non-Walrasian economy). The stationary interest rate is in both cases equal to the
consumer’s subjective time discount rate: r¤ = ¯ r = ½.
At this interest rate, there is a continuum of stationary state equilibria ( ¯ w;¯ k; ¯ y; ¯ qd) with full
employment in the non-Walrasian economy. To characterise the range of possible steady-state
equilibria, we index the equilibrium values of ¯ w, ¯ k, ¯ y by (expected) demand ¯ qd. The extremal
values of each variable can be computed by setting demand expectations at their lowest (¯ qd = ¯ q¡)
and highest (¯ qd = ¯ q+) admissible values (see (17)). We thus deﬁne ¯ k+ (resp. ¯ k¡) as the
stationary state capital stock under persistently high (resp. low) demand expectations. We
similarly deﬁne ¯ w§; ¯ y§.
By comparing the implications of (20) and (23) (for ¯ qd = ¯ q¡ and ¯ qd = ¯ q+ respectively) to those
of (7) and (14) in the Walrasian economy, it is easily shown that the non-Walrasian equilibria
are bounded from above by the Walrasian equilibrium and that the following ranking holds (see
appendix 2 for a discussion of the Cobb-Douglas case):
¯ k¡ < ¯ k+ = k¤ and ¯ w¡ < ¯ w+ = w¤: (24)
A comparable ranking holds for output. The length of the intervals [¯ k¡;¯ k+] and [ ¯ w¡; ¯ w+] cannot
be further characterised without more speciﬁc assumptions about the production technology.
This is done below for the Cobb Douglas case.
The realisation of a particular steady-state equilibrium relies on the fact that demand expecta-
tions remain unchanged at some given value within the interval [¯ q¡, ¯ q+]. The particular case
¯ qd = ¯ q+ would imply the same transactions as in the Walrasian economy. One might thus
wonder why ﬁrms’ expectations would deviate persistently from ¯ q+ along a steady state. In
13our setup, individual rationality does not lead ﬁrms to necessarily expect ¯ qd = ¯ q+. Because an
individual ﬁrm’s decisions have a negligible macroeconomic impact, the individual ﬁrm cannot
change its own expected sales by its sole action. Being more optimistic and investing more than
all the other producers would be suboptimal and lead to a too large capital stock. Being more
pessimistic would lead to underinvestment and to loosing proﬁtable sales opportunities. This
means that once a relatively pessimistic atmosphere has established itself, a unilateral change
in expectations is never proﬁtable. It is only a coordinated change in expectations that can give
intermediate ﬁrms an incentive to invest more.
The size of the interval of indeterminacy clearly depends on the degree of uncertainty about
productivity, i.e. on values µ+, µ¡ and the probability ¼. It is obvious that the measure of the
interval of indeterminacy goes to zero when either µ+ = µ¡ or when the probability ¼ goes to
either 1 or 0. I.e., the continuum of equilibria shrinks to the Walrasian equilibrium point when
uncertainty vanishes. In the absence of microeconomic uncertainty, the decentralised working of
the input market does not raise any information problem and allows the economy to reach the
Walrasian optimum.
Note ﬁnally that the interval of indeterminacy is necessarily larger at a stationary state than at
ﬁxed, predetermined capital stock. In a stationary perspective, persistently high or low demand
expectations imply capital stock adjustments. The short-run (negative) output and employment
eﬀects of lower demand expectations are thus reinforced in the longer run by downward capital
adjustments.
The Cobb Douglas case
Using the deﬁnitions of `¡
t and `d
t (see equations (40) and (44) in appendix 1), aggregate demand
for labour can be recast as follows:
L(kt;!t;qd
t ;Θ) = ¼ `¡




where xt ´ qd
t =q¡
t and #t is deﬁned as








14Variable xt takes values over the interval [1; q+
t =q¡
t ]. By using the equations deﬁning q§
t (see
(40)), one easily checks that #(xt) takes values over the following interval:
#¡ · #(xt) · #+ ; where #§ ´
2












At given wage and capital stock, changes in input demand may thus generate changes in the
aggregate labour demand within the following interval:
`¡
t #¡ · L(kt;!t;qd
t ;Θ) · `¡
t #+ : (28)
When demand expectations are persistently high or low, the capital stock adjusts as described











these ratios going to 1 when uncertainty vanishes.
The long run eﬀects of demand expectations on the aggregate labour demand and on full-
employment equilibrium wages are illustrated in ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure is drawn under the as-
sumptions of constant returns to scale and ¼ = 0:5; ® = 1 ¡ ¯ = 2=3; µ¡=µ+ = 0:98 and
µ+ = 1:1. With constant returns to scale, the long-run labour demand schedule is a horizon-
tal line deﬁned by (19); its position depends on the capital usage cost and also in our setup
on demand expectations qd. In the high-expectations case (qd = q+), all ﬁrms are producing
at full-capacity as in the standard Walrasian model; the long-run labour demand schedule is
represented by the continuous horizontal line. With a vertical labour supply (normalised to
1), the full-employment high-expectations equilibrium coincides with the stationary Walrasian
equilibrium. When demand expectations are the most pessimistic (qd = q¡), the labour demand
schedule shifts downwards, as shown by the horizontal dotted line. The two downward-sloping
curves represent the corresponding short-run labour demand schedules, i.e., they show the eﬀects
of wage changes on the aggregate demand for labour at given capital stock, respectively k+ in
the high expectations case (represented by a continuous line) and k¡ in the low expectations
case (dashed line). Lower demand expectations imply lower equilibrium wages.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀects of demand expectation changes at unchanged capital stock. In
this example, the value of the capital stock is ﬁxed at its Walrasian level (k = k+). When








Figure 1: Long-run full-employment equilibria at high- and low demand expectation levels
Parameter values:
® = 1 ¡ ¯ = 2=3, ¼ = 0:5, µ¡




At stationary equilibrium 0:9774 0:9922
At given k 0:9848 0:9998
Table 1: Interval of equilibrium values
demand expectations are high, the short-run aggregate labour demand schedule is given by
the continuous downward-sloping curve, as in ﬁgure 1. When demand expectations are more
pessimistic and take their lowest possible value (given k), the aggregate demand for labour
decreases at all wage levels, as represented by the dashed-dotted line. It is readily seen that the
range of full-employment equilibrium wage values is smaller than in the case with capital stock
adjustments.
Table 1 provides a numerical illustration of these results. Demand expectations changes have
less impact on wages and output in the short run (i.e., at given, predetermined capital stock
kt) than they have in the long run (at the stationary state). Long lasting changes in demand
expectations have more eﬀect on equilibrium output than short-lived ones, via their eﬀects on
capital accumulation (a kind of accelerator mechanism).








Figure 2: Short-run full-employment equilibria at high- and low demand expectation levels
4 Unemployment Equilibria
Up to now we assumed a perfectly competitive labour market with exogenous labour supply.
We now introduce real rigidities and show that they may considerably amplify the size of the
interval of indeterminacy and of demand expectations eﬀects.
The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. Assume to simplify that ﬁrms use constant
return technologies. We know that in such circumstances the long run Walrasian labour demand
schedule is horizontal, so that the long run (stationary state) equilibrium real wage is entirely
determined on the labour demand side. The stationary state value of the capital stock is ﬁxed via
the full-employment/ﬁxed labour supply assumption, which determines the size of the economy.
Adding idiosyncratic shocks and imperfect information as we did in the previous section enlarges
this setup by introducing an interval of stationary equilibrium real wage and capital stock values,
as described in (29). The representation of the labour market equilibrium is shown in ﬁgure 1.
If we now replace the full-employment/ﬁxed labour supply assumption by a ﬁxed real wage
assumption, any point in the area delineated by the horizontal continuous and dotted lines
(respectively the long-run high- and low-expectations labour demand curves) can be a stationary
equilibrium. The size of the economy is no longer determined. As we move towards lower
employment rates (to the left in the labour market diagram), it suﬃces to satisfy the equilibrium
conditions that the changes in observed employment be matched by proportional changes in the
17capital stock, and that both the employment and the capital stock changes be proportional to
the changes in expected output. For each employment level, demand expectations may of course
be high or low (resp. q+ and q¡). The ratio between the high- and low-expectation values of
the variables remains unchanged. The level of the variables is no longer deﬁned, as each of them
(expectations, capital stock and employment level) decreases at the same rate8.
This is obviously a too simple and extreme case. A more general representation should take into
account the wage adjustments induced by unemployment changes. In order to take such wage
adjustments into account, we now consider a simple right-to-manage-monopoly-union model.
We assume that the monopoly union behaves myopically and maximises in each period a static
objective function with the current employment and real wage rates as arguments. This is
admittedly ad hoc, but will suﬃce to illustrate the eﬀects of real rigidities in the imperfect
information setup examined so far. With perfect information, this representation would yield a
standard equilibrium unemployment (nairu) model, with a unique equilibrium unemployment
rate (see for instance Layard etal. (1991)). This representation thus provides a nice benchmark
case.
Trade Union Behaviour
Let function U(Lt;!t) represent the preferences of the monopoly union over employment L and
real wage ! in period t. Function U is increasing and quasi-concave in its arguments.
The union chooses the wage of period t given the labour demand schedule at given capital stock
kt. Assuming a Cobb Douglas technology (see appendix 1 for details on the behaviour of ﬁrms

























The optimality condition for wt implies that the wage rate be such that the marginal rate of
substitution between wage and employment is equal to (the absolute value of) the wage elasticity
8This case is an example (admittedly a very speciﬁc one) of a Walras-Keynes equilibrium as deﬁned in Dr` eze
(1997).




















Lt represents the weighted proportion of ﬁrms experiencing a low productivity shock.
Because the labour demand of sales-constrained ﬁrms is not sensitive to the wage rate, the wage
elasticity of aggregate employment is (in absolute value) smaller than in the perfect information
case. At given capital stock, it is furthermore decreasing in the aggregate employment level
since the weighted proportion of supply-constrained ﬁrms then decreases.
By using (25)-(27) in (33), the inverse of j´tj can be written as:
1
j´tj
= (1 ¡ ®)
#(xt)
¼





and #¡ · #(xt) · #+ : (34)











The union’s optimal wage will thus be larger, ceteris paribus, in situations with larger demand
expectations (larger values of xt), because the aggregate labour demand becomes less sensitive
to the wage rate.
Equilibrium Unemployment
Deﬁnition
An equilibrium with unemployment in period t is a vector of prices fpt;rt+1;!tg such that, at
given capital stock kt and given expectations on marginal utility of consumption ¸t+1, future
demand level qd
t+1 and future wage !t+1, the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. ﬁnal and intermediate goods producers maximise expected proﬁts; consumers maximise
utility;
192. on the intermediate goods markets, a proportion ¼ of ﬁrms experiences a low productivity
shock and produces q¡
t , a proportion 1 ¡ ¼ experiences a high productivity shock and
produces qd
t ; there is competitive equilibrium on the ﬁnal good market;
3. on the labour market, the wage rate is set by the union of workers and may imply unem-
ployment.
The equilibrium conditions on the ﬁnal and intermediate goods market are thus unchanged (see
equations (21) and (22)). On the labour market, the equilibrium condition (23) is replaced by:
L(kt;!t;qd
t ;Θ) = ¼ `(kt; !t;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)`d(kt; qd
t ;µ+) · 1; (36)
where !t is given by (32).
As in the full-employment case, the equilibrium so deﬁned is not uniquely determined. With
decentralised trading and microeconomic uncertainty (µ¡ < µ+ and ¼ 2]0;1[), the equilibrium
unemployment rate is not uniquely deﬁned and depends on demand expectations9.
Illustration













with a > 0; and 0 < b;c · 1: (37)













where !0 can be interpreted as unemployment beneﬁt. In the particular case where c = b and
a ! 0, the wage-setting rule is the one of a utilitarian trade-union with logarithmic preferences.
The wage setting-rule would then be a horizontal line in the ! ¡ L space. Our numerical
example is based on the same values as in the previous section for the labour demand function
(¼ = 0:5; ® = 1 ¡ ¯ = 2=3; µ¡=µ+ = 0:98; µ+ = 1:10), and on the following parameter values:
a = 0:5; b = 1:0; c = 0:25; !0 = 1:10 for the union’s objective function. The value of !0
9This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Lubrano et al. (1996) and Shadman-Sneessens (1998),
who ﬁnd that the equilibrium unemployment rate is not uniquely deﬁned and is aﬀected by both demand- and
supply-side variables.
20was chosen so as to reproduce the characteristics of the standard Walrasian full-employment
equilibrium in the high-expectations case (¯ qd = ¯ q+).
The locus of stationary unemployment equilibria obtained with these formulations and param-
eter values is reproduced in ﬁgure 3. The two long-run horizontal schedules are the same ones
as in ﬁgure 1. They represent the long run labour demand behaviours (with capital stock
adjustments taken into account) in the two extreme cases with respectively high- and low- de-
mand expectations. The two parallel upward-sloping schedules represent the wage-setting rule
(38) in the same two extreme cases. In the low-expectations case (dashed-dotted line), the
(absolute value of the) wage elasticity j¯ ´j is higher, and the optimal wage lower. The intersec-
tion between the two continuous lines determines the high-expectations stationary equilibrium
(with ¯ x = ¯ qd=¯ q¡ = ¯ q+=¯ q¡ > 1). By construction it coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium.
The intersection between the dotted horizontal line and the upward-sloping dashed-dotted line
determines the low-expectations stationary equilibrium (with ¯ x = ¯ qd=¯ q¡ = 1). In this nu-
merical example, the latter entails an equilibrium unemployment rate of about 20%. The two
downward-sloping schedules represent the short-run (i.e. at given capital stock) labour demand
behaviours. Because the stationary equilibrium value of the capital stock is much lower in
the low-expectations case, the corresponding short-run labour demand schedule (the downward-
sloping dashed-dotted line) is far on the left of its high-expectations counterpart (the continuous
downward-sloping line). All intermediate cases can be similarly obtained, by varying the value
x = qd=q¡. The locus of all stationary unemployment equilibria is represented by the thick
dark dashed line of ﬁgure 3. Changes in demand expectations generate pro-cyclical real wage
changes, and contra-cyclical changes in “equilibrium unemployment”.
In the short-run, at ﬁxed predetermined capital stock, (unanticipated) changes in demand ex-
pectations cannot have such an enormous impact on equilibrium unemployment. Figure 4 re-
produces the same information as ﬁgure 3 for the high-expectations case. The low-expectations
case is now computed at unchanged capital stock. The change in demand expectations shifts the
labour demand schedule to the left, but at unchanged capital stock the shift is limited. The locus
of all short-run unemployment equilibria (when the initial capital stock is at a value compatible
with full-employment) is represented by the thick dark dashed line of ﬁgure 4. It is clear from








Figure 3: Locus of long-run unemployment equilibria
the comparison of ﬁgures 3 and 4 that despite the indetermination, the economy remains fairly
stable in the short-run. In the longer-run though, the eﬀects of persistently pessimistic demand
expectations are ampliﬁed by capital stock adjustments, much more so than in the competitive
labour market case.
5 Conclusions
This paper illustrates how in a market economy with decentralised trading the existence of a
microeconomic uncertainty may create an information problem between agents and generate
genuine demand expectations eﬀects (in investment decisions) and equilibrium indeterminacy.
It is worth stressing that the range of possible equilibria converges to the unique Walrasian
equilibrium in the limit case where the microeconomic uncertainty vanishes: the agents then
possess all the relevant information and decentralised trading raises no coordination diﬃculty.
If the labour market is perfectly competitive and there is full-employment of a ﬁxed labour
supply, the range of equilibria depends directly on the size of the microeconomic uncertainty. In
the presence of real wage rigidities, the size of the indeterminacy may be considerably ampliﬁed.
At variance with standard equilibrium unemployment models (nairu models), there is then a
continuum of equilibrium unemployment rates, which can be indexed by demand expectations.
Higher demand expectations are associated with higher activity, higher capital stock and wages,








Figure 4: Locus of short-run unemployment equilibria
lower unemployment, and conversely.
The model developed in this paper is admittedly a very stylised one. In an economy like the one
sketched here, what each agent needs to anticipate includes the anticipations and behaviours of
all the other agents. This aspect should be explored further. Moreover, we have analysed the
consequences of a particular form of decentralised trading (sales on order) without justifying it
formally. This representation of the working of the intermediate goods market does certainly
not provide an adequate description of the working of all goods markets in an actual economy.
It stresses though that if on some markets ﬁrms produce and sell on orders, there is room for
demand expectations eﬀects on the determination of the macroeconomic equilibrium.
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25Appendix 1: Firms’ behaviour with Cobb Douglas technologies
Assume the following Cobb Douglas technology
qt = µt `®
t k
¯
t ; ® + ¯ · 1 ; (39)
The Walrasian economy
The employment and production decisions are
`§






















t ) then becomes
Π§
t = (1 ¡ ®) pt q(kt; !t;µ§) (41)














































; 8 t: (43)
By using the optimality condition (43), one checks easily that the expected value of proﬁts is
given by:






















































26Appendix 2: Stationary equilibria with full employment
The general case
In a stationary equilibrium of the Walrasian economy, the investment equation (6) and the
labour market clearing condition (14) become
½ + ± = ¼ ¼k(k;!;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)¼k(k;!;µ+) (46)
1 = ¼ `(k;!;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)`(k;!;µ+) (47)
and determine the stationary values (k¤;!¤).
In a stationary equilibrium of the non-Walrasian economy, the investment equation (19) and the
labour market clearing condition (23) become
½ + ± = ¼ ¼k(k;!;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)¼d
k(k;qd;!;µ+) (48)
1 = ¼ `(k;!;µ¡) + (1 ¡ ¼)`d(k;qd;µ+) (49)
and determine the stationary values (¯ k; ¯ !) in function of ¯ qd.
Let ¯ !¡ and ¯ k¡ (resp. ¯ !+ and ¯ k+) represent the real wage and capital stock level in a stationary
equilibrium where ﬁrms have persistently low (resp. high) demand expectations, i.e. where
¯ qd = ¯ q¡ (resp. ¯ qd = ¯ q+).
Substituting qd by q¡ and q+ respectively into (48-49) makes obvious that ¯ k¡ < ¯ k+ and ¯ !¡ <
¯ !+.
Furthermore, when qd = q+ = q(k;!;µ+), (49) is obviously identical to (47) because
`d(k;qd = q+;µ+) = `(k;!;µ+) = `+:





















= µ+ fk(k;`+) since ! = µ+ f`(k;`+)
= ¼k(k;!;µ+):
27Consequently, (48-49) is identical to (46-47) when qd = q+ and thus admits the same solution:
i.e., (¯ k+; ¯ !+) = (k¤;!¤).
The Cobb Douglas case
Let us ﬁrst focus on the stationary state equilibrium of the Walrasian economy. The labour
market clearing condition (14) gives the following relationship between the equilibrium real
wage and the installed capital stock




































Substituting !¤ by its value from (50) into the demand for capital (51) gives the following

















In a stationary equilibrium of the non-Walrasian economy, (14) implies that when ﬁrms have
persistently low (resp. high) demand expectations one has
¯ w§ = ®µ¡ (¯ k§)¯
0

























































A comparison between (52) and (55) makes obvious that ¯ k¡ < ¯ k+ = k¤. Furthermore, dividing
(54) for ¯ k+ by (54) for ¯ k¡ gives the value of the ratio ¯ k+=¯ k¡ given in the main text. After
introducing (55) into (53), one obtains easily the same value for the ratio ¯ w+= ¯ w¡.
28